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The trustworthiness of scientific findings is at the center
of current scholarly and public debates. The contestation
of scientific knowledge claims by critics outside science
and by reform movements within science is a welcome
reason to take a break from our everyday tasks as
scientists and to reflect upon our doings as professional
truth seekers. It is no wonder that psychological science
in particular—where the “replication crisis” has shattered
not only established literatures but also the identities of
many researchers—shows a surge in meta-scientific inter-
est. Empirical scholarswhousually botherwith t-tests and
sample recruitment are now revisiting fundamental ques-
tions of scientific inquiry: on what grounds can we claim
that scientific findings deserve trust? What makes the “sci-
entificmethod” a superior gateway toknowledge, andwhat
constitutes that “scientific method” in the first place?
Two new, timely books reconsider these questions.
In Why Trust Science? Naomi Oreskes condenses philo-
sophical accounts of whether and how scholarly inquiry
can discover truths about the world. In Transparent and
Reproducible Social Science Research: How to DoOpen
Science, Garret Christensen, Jeremy Freese, and Edward
Miguel examine the practice of scholarly inquiry,
describing what needs to be done so that the reality of
scientific knowledge creation more closely aligns with
philosophical ideals. Together, these books demonstrate
the range of what we can learn from the new wave of
“research on research,” both as curious citizens and as
academic scholars.
Oreskes, a Harvard University professor, is famous
for a study on climate change (Oreskes, 2004), in which
she employs consensus analysis of the scientific literature
to establish the now oft-cited fact that agreement exists
among scientific experts on the presence of anthropo-
genic climate change. In Why Trust Science? Oreskes
picks up on the concept of “consensus” to argue that
science’s social nature is key to its success and legitimacy.
The book takes the reader on an intellectual exped-
ition into the epistemological foundations of science. It
is one of those texts that require the reader to take a
pause after each page to scribble down all the new ideas
that challenge or enrich one’s views of the world. For
instance, the book rebuts common ideas about the infor-
mational value of single experiments. Many scholars
are aware of the impossibility of verifying a theory but
believe in scientific progress through theory falsification.
Yet, as any scholar has discovered whose studies have
yielded hypothesis-incongruent results, in contrast with
the idea of a crucial experiment, null results rarely or
never compel the conclusive refutation of a theory
because any particular set of results is consistent with
numerous explanations, including errors in measure-
ment or study administration. In this vein, the principle
of underdetermination discussed by Oreskes suggests
that any empirical test helps confirm or weaken a theory
and its accompanying auxiliary hypotheses merely in a
probabilistic sense, suggesting a much more confined
informational value of empirical findings than is some-
times stated. Insights like these are representative of
Oreskes’s general approach, which challenges wide-
spread Popperian ideas and, at first sight, seems to paint
a bleak picture of science’s explanatory power.
Oreskes guides the reader through hundreds of years
of philosophy of science, weaving the different threads of
thought together to convince one that there is no such
thing as a scientific method. Science merely denotes the
range of behavior that the collective of academic experts
considers appropriate for approaching an unresolved
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question. Complicating matters for the legitimacy of
science, there is therefore no “magic key,” no single
method that could establish the superiority of science
over other means of knowledge acquisition. Because a
“scientific method” does not exist, there is thus also no
standard that could ensure the validity of any particular
knowledge claim.Hence, Oreskes considers the dream of
positive knowledge unattainable, and not even science
can help us to ever know something for sure.
Liberating scientific inquiry from expectations that it
is deemed to fail enables Oreskes to make a modest but
persuasive case for the trustworthiness of science. Even
though there is no magic key to positive knowledge, and
even though previous experience indicates that today’s
scientific truth claims will likely be considered imperfect
or outright false in the future, Oreskes holds that there
are good reasons for trust in science. What characterizes
the epistemic value of science, according to Oreskes, is
scientists’ sustained engagement with the world and
science’s social character; like a plumber who deals with
pipes day in and day out, a neuroscientist has likely
engagedmore thoroughly with the brain thanmost other
individuals and thus has more knowledge about the
appropriate research methods to examine a particular
question about the human brain. Moreover, the neuro-
scientist’s findings are vetted and potentially revised by
other scholars with field expertise. Hence, all academic
findings are ultimately yielded through social inter-
actions, which make them more robust against individ-
ual biases and oversights. Altogether, while Oreskes’s
characterization of science’s epistemic qualities is more
profane than we might have hoped for, the demystifica-
tion of science makes for an honest and pragmatic case
for the value of scientific inquiry.
Still, science has no exclusive right to credible know-
ledge claims, and any scientific finding may turn out to
be wrong. Hence, while deep substance knowledge and
social vetting foster the trustworthiness of scientific evi-
dence, some scientific truth claims aremore credible than
others. Here, Oreskes picks up on her earlier work to
argue that scientific knowledge claims are most credible
when they represent a consensus of field experts. What is
more, credibility is greatest when the scientific consensus
is established through open discourse that considers
the input of diverse participants with different points
of view.
Oreskes’s book is authoritative when summarizing
the long line of philosophical thinking on science, but it
is less convincing when discussing current meta-scientific
work on the actual practice of contemporary science. In
one of the chapters replying to her main arguments,
political psychologist John Krosnick points to science’s
current “replication crisis.” He discusses structural
biases in the academic incentive structure that would
have the consequence of repeatedly producing false
scholarly consensus because the scientific literature
rarely presents the entire, available evidence. However,
in her response, Oreskes brushes most of Krosnick’s
concerns about systemic threats to the credibility of
scientific findings away, despite a rapidly growing body
of evidence to the contrary. For instance, she suggests
that discussions about structural shortcomings in replic-
ability and transparency were confined mostly to psych-
ology or biomedicine (pp. 228, 230) and that replication
failures solely refuted single studies but not established
phenomena representing scholarly consensus (p. 233f).
These claims do not reflect the current state of meta-
scientific research. While the intensity differs across
academic fields, it is hard to find a discipline in which
the systemic lack of replicability and transparency is not
being discussed (Baker, 2016; Christensen et al., 2019).
“Open science” is a current topic in diverse disciplines
such as dinosaur paleontology (Tennant&Farke, 2019),
ecology (Powers & Hampton, 2019), and communica-
tion and political science (Dienlin et al., 2020; Wuttke,
2019). Also, while Oreskes is right to remind advocates
of open science reforms like myself that robust empirical
evidence on these topics is still scarce, it is not true that
recent meta-scientific research has only upset singular
studies, but it has also fundamentally challenged text-
book phenomena that previously had widespread sup-
port in the literature, such as ego depletion (Friese et al.,
2019) and social priming (Chivers, 2019). Notably,
while Oreskes perceives these failed replications as
evidence for the functioning self-correction of science,
she overlooks that scholars needed and still need to
overcome structural hurdles in attempts to publish rep-
lications that refute conventional scholarly wisdom
(Goldacre et al., 2019). Most crucially, therefore, while
Oreskes makes the general point that we should be
concerned about the epistemic value of consensus if
“evidence is being discounted or being weighted asym-
metrically” (p. 141), she disregards the arguments and
evidence for the relevance of structural biases in contem-
porary science despite academia’s incentive structure
that favors novel, clean, and exciting results and disre-
gards replication evidence, null results, or complex find-
ings that do not tell a simple story.
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Problems arising from these incentive structures,
potential remedies, and practical implications for indi-
vidual researchers are discussed in another new book
with a meta-scientific focus. With Transparent and
Reproducible Social Science Research: How to Do
Open Science, Christensen, Freese, and Miguel provide
the first book-length primer on contemporary open sci-
ence debates in the social sciences. Theoretically and
empirically, the book highlights selected examples from
the burgeoningmeta-scientific literature to illustrate how
the scientific reward system implemented by journals or
hiring committees promotes publication bias, p-hacking,
and selective reporting. For instance, they describe a
study by Franco et al. (2014) of a National Science
Foundation–sponsored competition among scholars that
allowed 221 survey projects to be fielded free of charge.
The analysis of the entire population of fielded research
projects reveals that results were three times more likely
to find their way into the scientific record when the
obtained findings were clean and consistent with a priori
hypotheses. In the case of null or mixed results, scholars
often failed to guide the study through peer review or did
not even try, so that, in effect, the scholarly community is
unlikely to find out about these results.
The book by Christensen, Freese, and Miguel thus
shows that scholarly norms and scientific gatekeepers
intentionally or unintentionally cause a structural under-
representation of particular studies, depending on the
research results. Because not everything that scientists
discover about the world has an equal chance of getting
published, the published literature paints a distorted
picture of the accumulated knowledge. These biases are
a problem for anyone who wants to examine the pub-
lished literature to determine whether a consensus exists
among academic experts on a particular question.
As remedies, the book proposes preregistration to
prevent specification search and sensitivity analyses to
reveal the entire evidence underlying a knowledge claim.
If the authors’ diagnosis of incentive-induced structural
biases in the academic literature is correct, and if the
suggested tools are adequate remedies, then we would
expect the composition of scientific literatures to change
after modifying the incentive structure and implementing
bias-mitigating reforms. While not yet conclusive, recent
studies provide empirical support for this proposition,
showing that minimizing opportunities for specification
search and rewarding sound questions and methods
independent of the study’s outcome affect the composition
of published findings such as the share of hypothesis-
refuting results (Kaplan & Irvin, 2015; Kvarven et al.,
2019; Murray et al., 2020; Scheel et al., 2020). While
norms and incentive structures, therefore, seem key to
understanding and overcoming biases and thus to increase
the epistemological value of researcher consensus in the
published literature, the book also provides practical
advice for individual researchers who want to make their
studies more informative.
The book offers guidance for opening up one’s
research process by publishing data, programming intel-
ligible code, and conforming with reporting standards.
In this vein, the book’s advice and the aspirations of the
open science movement on which it draws can be under-
stood as an attempt to enable other researchers to mean-
ingfully vet and potentially revise scientific claims. In
other words, by being transparent in all phases of a
research project, by making the entire evidence access-
ible, by sharing material and documenting methods, the
open science practices illustrated in the book create the
conditions that help to realize the epistemological poten-
tial of science’s social character that Oreskes has identi-
fied (Elman et al., 2018).Hence, despite differences in the
appraisal of current meta-scientific findings, the two
books share a common understanding of the fundamen-
tal prerequisites for credible science.
Moreover, both books consider science as generally
trustworthy while at the same time emphasizing the pro-
visional nature of any single study. Potentially explaining
why the books interpret current meta-scientific findings
differently, some empirical scholars who believe in our
ability to resolve unsettled questions if we only work hard
enough on a research design have had to learn the hard
way about the provisional nature of all scientific findings.
Philosophers and historians of science, in contrast, may
not be as surprised about low replicability rates, as they
have always been aware that all scientific knowledge
claims are incomplete and thereforewill ultimately require
revision or refutation.
Finally, these two books and the new wave of meta-
science research remind us that scientific findings are not
yielded through godly spark or an invincible “scientific
method.”Rather, scientific findings are human creations
and the rules by which we produce and evaluate these
findings are also social products. Both books thus remind
us to, occasionally, take a moment for self-reflection to
question what we are doing as individual researchers or
as a scientific community and whether we should over-
come certain habits to get better at our job of explaining
the world around us.
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